The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs geometrical boundaries to the placement a certain percentage of the tactical nuclear weapons of each of the nuclear weapon states on the chopping block.
Throughout the late 1990s, great efforts were taken to determine how to recognize a zone that included both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, and how momentum could be maintained in the push toward a nuclear weapons free zone. This led to the formulation of a three "basket" approach toward achievement of the zone. These baskets were: first, the structure, characteristics, and other details of the LNWFZ-NEA, second the confidence building measures necessary to provide an impetus for some participants to remain members in goodstanding.
The zone would be limited both with respect to geography and weapon systems. That is, it would not apply to the entire territory of some member states-notably China, Russia, and US, and it would apply only to tactical weapons. This has presented problems for the prospects of advancing the plan. First and foremost among these difficulties is that it would not be in accordance with the generally accepted definition of a nuclear weapons free zone. Such definitions require prohibition of all nuclear weapons (strategic as well as tactical) within all of the territory of the participating states. Many rail against the notion of a zone that would not include the most devastating of the weapons and that would only touch portions of some of the members.
What must be remembered is that the LNWFZ-NEA as it has been proposed is not meant to create the final once-and-for-all disposition of the question of nuclear weapons in the region. Instead, it is meant to break down intractable barriers into tractable hurdles.
Without a period in which relations are established and confidence built, those who seek an "all-or-none" outcome will perpetually end up with "none". The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) resulted in an agreement that was weak on verification and put a number of nuclear weapon systems beyond consideration of the agreement, and it has been much decried in the arms control community as a poor agreement. On the other hand, START I is praised as a model of verification and "closed loop-holes." But what we must remember is that START I was built on confidence established under SALT I. I would agree that the two parties could not have gone straight to an agreement Number 14, 2007 that required the degree of openness seen in the START I Treaty because they had not established the relationships necessary.
It is also important to remember that it is crucial to include the nuclear weapon states-China, Russia, and the United States-in the process of a Northeast Asia zone. There is a chain that must be considered. The nuclear status of the non-nuclear weapon states depends on the nuclear postures and doctrines of the nuclear weapon states. For example, Japan's continued willingness to forgo nuclear weapons is influenced by China's nuclear doctrine and posture; China's nuclear policy is influenced by Russia's and US's, and so on.
2001 saw the development if a draft treaty constructed by the members of the ESP that would be submitted for consideration by Track I negotiators.
As this decade has progressed, the members if the LNWFZ-NEA have watched the ups and downs of the Six-Party talks, and have been hopeful that they would be successful. The success of these talks would go a long way toward achieving the goals espoused by the Extended Senior Panel and would have a stabilizing effect on the region. I will conclude by speaking about the future of the LNWFZ-NEA. At present, plans are underway to hold the 11 th plenary meeting in Tokyo, Japan on October 1 st -3 rd of this year. The selection of Tokyo as a venue is meant to reiterate support for those who wish to continue Japan's policy of remaining a nuclear weapons free state. The October plenary
